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Multiculturalism and the Roman Empire 
 
KIM, Kyung-hyun 
 
1. Can American Multiculturalism learn from the Roman Empire’s 
Multicultural Experience? 
     Recently there have been several attempts to illuminate the USA’s place in 
the contemporary world through analogy with the Roman empire. Possibly the 
main inducement for this is the demise of multipolarized world politics and the 
coming of Pax Americana. The USA is the world’s only remaining superpower, 
much as Rome once allegedly was. Yet the analogy remains rudimentary, mostly 
confined to terse, impressionistic comments by publicists and international 
affairs specialists. 1  It can’t be otherwise, considering that Pax Americana has 
just set in, thus denying any discussion as fait accomplit.  Above all, there is 
little adequate historical data to work with. We may well have to wait till 
American empire declines in order to witness full-fledged comparative analyses 
of American and Roman empires such as P.A. Brunt’s brilliant article comparing 
Roman and British imperialism. 2 
     Looking at American conditions in the light of their Roman parallel has also 
been tried in the sphere of domestic affairs, more effectively so for the obvious 
reason that in this case sufficient material is in store for comparative studies. 
Slavery has been long a conspicuous topic of these studies, but seemingly 
outworn nowadays. Another equally manifest and practicable subject is the 
problems an empire (or a nation) with multiracial or multiethnic population 
ought to cope with. Yet this focus has materialized only came lately, receiving 
decisive momentum from American social realities which lead to the 
multiculturalism movement since the 1980’s.  The recent article of K. Galinsky, 
                                                                 
1 Cf. J. Nye, The Paradox of American Power. Oxford University Press, 2003, passim; Z. 
Brezezinski, The Grand Chessboard. Basic Books, 1998, ch. 1. 
2 Cf. P.A. Brunt, “Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 7, 1965; G. Miles, “Roman and Modern Imperialism,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 32, 1990. In the meantime, the French historian E. Todd 
wants to detect in the present American world-order many a symptom of its undergoing 
decomposition, explaining them as foibles in parallel with and more often against Roman 
precedents. See his Après l’Empire. Gallimard, 2002, chs. 3 and 5. Yet, his premise is hardly 
agreeable. 
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a white, male American classicist, is a fine example, and in fact is the one that 
provoked me to write this paper. 3  What I want to do here is to review through   
the eyes of an East-Asian classicist his suggestion that American 
multiculturalism should learn from the Roman empire’s comparable experience. 
Thus my task is a double-sided: firstly, to show the present state of the American 
multiculturalism debate  (as well as grasp Galinsky’s stance on it); secondly, to 
explain what the Roman empire’s multiculturalism was like and its effects on 
imperial integration. Let me first clarify the first task in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
     Multiculturalism is a recent coinage that literally refers to the state of 
coexistence in a society of multiple cultures of race, ethnicity, religion, gender and 
sexuality.  Yet this literal sense soon pales as one is challenged with the practical 
question:  in what way ought they to coexist? Differing and even conflicting 
answers are produced, reflecting unique interests and value judgments of 
respective cultural identities. To put it allegorically: ‘different dreams on the 
same bed (同床異夢)’ is of necessity the realities of multiculturalism. Indeed, such 
was the state of thing in the USA of 80~90’s.  There, multiculturalism started as 
a discourse nurtured by progressive sectors,   including university campuses, 
and its cardinal tenet was the equal recognition of each cultural group based 
upon its own peculiar and intrinsic identity. Though the minorities in gender and 
sexuality were also involved, the main force and energy mobilized for the cultural 
movement came from ethnic/racial minorities, especially Afro-Americans, but 
including ethnic Spanish groups and Asians of different stripes. It is inevitable 
that the recognition of the struggle of ethnic groups should entail an aspect of 
denying and even attacking the dominant American majority (frequently dubbed 
WASPs) and their value-system. Multiculturalism in America often assumed an 
aspect of ‘civil war’ between WASPs and ethnic groups.  
In a sense, that cultural civil war was a natural sequel to the minority 
movements triggered by the Civil Rights Movement of the 50~60’s.  On the other 
hand, however, it marked a violent rupture with the past by declaring a 
withdrawal from a consensus for assimilation. Assimilation had been the 
                                                                 
3  “Multiculturalism in Greece and Rome,” in K. Galinksy (ed.), Classical and Modern 
Interactions, Postmodern Architecture, Multiculturalism, Decline and Other Issues, 
University of Texas Press, 1992, ch. 5. 
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keyword controlling the USA’s immigrant policy and was also generally accepted 
as a premise in the Civil Rights Movement. It signified new citizens’ 
Americanization: namely, regardless of origin, they were expected to share and 
participate in fundamental “American” values and institutions such as freedom, 
human rights, democracy, and so forth. The curriculum of public education and 
the use of English as the nation’s official language constituted the essential tools 
of assimilation. 4  The imagery of ‘melting pot’ or the Latin legend ‘e pluribus 
unum’ inscribed on all USA coinage well reflects that ideal of assimilation. 
     Yet, in the multicultural enthusiasm of the ethnic and racial minorities of 
the 80’s the ideal began to be seen as an insuperable, huge obstacle in 
advancement towards real equality between majority and minorities. For, 
according to the ethnic multiculturalists, the American culture imposed upon 
them on the pretext of its being the common asset of all Americans was, in fact, 
nothing but the ethnocentric culture of WASPs, ultimately inherited from 
Western European civilizations. Curricula of schools, elementary as well as 
higher, were evident proof of the argument: major subjects in liberal arts, in 
history, philosophy, literature and music, were unvaryingly filled with western 
classics. In being forced to learn only the majority’s monoculture, they argued, 
the minorities were losing in two important respects: firstly, in competition with 
the majority in and out of school, they had to start always with so enormous a 
handicap that they would be doomed to failure, for which Affirmative Action 
could never make up fully; secondly, having their cultural identity driven at bay 
by constant inculcation of the “Others’” culture, minorities could hardly be able to 
have confidence in their own human identity and dignity. 
     This cultural rebellion unfolded in two directions. One was ‘the Battle of the 
Schools’, to cite the words of the distinguished historian, A. Schlesinger, Jr.5   As 
illustrated by the 1989 report for reforming New York State public education, 
submitted by a committee mostly composed of Blacks and Hispanics,  ethnic 
minorities wanted their particular cultures to be included in curriculum and 
schoolbooks. 6  Their vision of preferred America was not anymore the ‘melting 
                                                                 
4 Cf. A.M. Schlesinger,Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society. 
New York, 1991, pp.15-19;N. Glazer, We are all Multiculturalists Now. Harvard University 
Press, 1997, chs. 5-6; L.W. Levine, The Opening of the American Mind. Beacon Press, 1996, 
ch. 6. 
5 That is the title of the 3rd chapter of his book cited above.  
6 Cf. N. Glazer, op.cit., chs. 1-2. 
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pot’ but the ‘salad bowl’ or the ‘glorious mosaic’, in which all ethnic and racial 
elements simply co-exist freed from the pressure of metamorphosis. The motto ‘e 
pluribus unum’ embodying assimilationism now must be substituted by another, 
multicultural motto ‘e pluribus plures’. 
     The other direction unfolded was seeking to establish each minority’s 
unique history so that it may recover self-esteem from the glorious past of its 
ancestry. This movement to employ history as a weapon was especially vigorous 
among Afro-Americans, who were ready to go back to Africa to find their glorious 
past. Such antagonists even went further to argue that the roots of European 
civilization were, in fact, African, and that the Greek philosophy, par excellence, 
was learned or stolen from the Egyptians.7  This so-called Afrocentrism needed 
to be promoted, they thought, as a necessary device in the confrontation with the 
WASPish eurocentristic monoculture. It was largely by riding on the high tide of 
Afrocentrism that Black Athena, written by the Cornell University Professor M. 
Bernal, white and male, achieved huge success, causing a sensation on campuses 
and media.8 On campuses, it is reported, white (including Jewish) teachers of 
classical antiquity were often challenged by ethnic students, in and outside the 
classroom, on the authenticity of what they were teaching.9 Concern over the 
ongoing multicultural threat to classical studies finally permeated into the 1993 
Presidential Address to the American Philological Association. “Where does the 
Classics fit into this? Sadly, our discipline too often regards development as a 
threat...And, sadder still, the Classics frequently supplies a prime target for 
attack, labelled as…the custodian of western tradition, the pillar of Eurocentrism. 
The current drive for multiculturalism appears in this light as the enemy (of 
ours).”10  
     It was not only white classists, but generally white leading intellectuals,  
liberal as well as conservative, who saw the developments of multiculturalism as 
menacing and ominous: ominous for the future of the American nation, for the 
ferocious ethnocentrism engendered by militant multiculturalists, not to speak of 
                                                                 
7 Cf. S. Howe, Afrocentrism: Mythical Past and Imagined Homes. Verso, 1998, chs. 11, and 
14-15. 
8 The kernel of his argumentation is well condensed in the book’s subtitle, The Afroasiatic 
Roots of Classical Civilization. 
9 Cf. M. Lefkowitz, Not Out of Africa: How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as 
History. Basic Books, 1996, ch. 1; D’Souza, Illiberal Education. The Free Press, 1991, ch. 4. 
10 E.S. Gruen, “Cultural Fictions and Cultural Identity,” Transactions of the American 
Philological Association 123, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
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separatism, would after all shatter the nation into pieces. A. Bloom’s million 
seller book published in 1987 was voicing conservatives’ angry lamentation over 
the “closing of the American mind” resulting from vociferous clamor for 
unconditional equality and rampant cultural relativism. 11 
     Even liberals who had been so far sympathetic to the improvement of 
minorities’ conditions expressed great concern over symptoms of decomposition of 
the nation. The unifying ideas that define nationality were imperative for 
America to continue its prosperity, or at least to preclude the danger of 
disintegration. To their understanding, the ideas could not be other than the ones 
of Western descent, of freedom, democracy, and human rights. In an effort to 
communicate with ethnic multiculturalists, liberals appealed to characteristic 
logic:  that the Western culture itself was a multicultural product, and that such 
ideas were the most universal ideals that human civilizations had so far 
produced. 12   A. Schlesinger put it succinctly: “Our task is to combine due 
appreciation of the splendid diversity of the nation with due emphasis on the 
great unifying Western ideas.”13 
     With this topography of American multiculturalism, I am now in a position 
to locate K. Galinsky’s standpoint, whose suggestion I propose to review in this 
paper.  To be brief, his stance does not seem to contradict what his ethnic and 
vocational identity, white classist, would dictate him to adopt: much of white 
liberals’ reaction to multiculturalism is echoed in his article. A few short excerpts 
will serve: “More generally, a core of shared ideas and beliefs, centering on liberty 
and democracy (both coming from the “western” tradition, has traditionally been 
at the center of American culture... Against this stands the cultural tribalism of 
much of the multicultural movement...”14 As he sees it, the source of the cultural 
tribalism is racial and ethnic bigotry. Hence he suggests, “the current 
multiculturalism debate would be improved by its absence.”15  And as a mirror 
for improvement he recommends the case of Greco- Roman multiculturalism. 
According to him, though “the Greco-Roman beginnings of   Western civilization 
                                                                 
11 Cf. A. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind. A Touchstone Book, 1987. See especially 
the Introduction and pp. 88-97. 
12 Cf. A. Schlesinger, op. cit., ch. 5; R.B. Tapp (ed.), Multiculturalism: Humanist Perspectives. 
Prometheus Books, 2000, chs. 8-9 and 13. 
13 Op. cit., p. 147. 
14 Ibid., p.151. 
15 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
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are the product of many different races and cultures”, racism had no place 
therein. One may wonder here whom Galinsky blames for the racial bigotry, but 
only a faint hint is given in a sentence. “The acceptance of Romanization in some 
provinces...may be of great discomfort to those who today define multiculturalism 
in terms of the rigid maintenance of separate cultural identities.”16 Thus, as I 
understand it, his position in the midst of the multiculturalism debate is as 
follows: while the American culture is already multicultural and universal 
enough despite its Western origin, ethnic multiculturalists do not want to 
concede and be assimilated to American culture because of their racial bigotry 
and separatism. 
     We would do well to question the way he attributes the causes of the ongoing 
cultural war, as well as the way he employs Roman precedent as a lesson only for 
ethnic multiculturalism. Let me raise a few points of doubt. Firstly, it is not fair 
to shoulder the blame for racial bigotry only on ethnic multiculturalism. He does 
seems to avert his eyes from the patent historical fact that racism is a cultural 
construct Western civilization first invented in the late Medieval Ages and has  
since elaborated, while ethnic minorities, colored or religious, were fated to be on 
the defensive against its ideological onslaught. Secondly, though equality is one 
of the keywords of ethnic multiculturalism, he like all white liberals does not 
count it in the inventory of the universal ideas that should define American 
nationality. Is it because equality is an idea that is prone to foster parochialism or 
separatism for those eagerly desiring it? 17 Thirdly, in looking at the Roman 
mirror, he is not attentive enough to its significant difference from the American 
case: that there was no Roman counterpart of the American majority/minorities 
glass wall, a barrier which is not likely to disappear in a foreseeable future. As we 
will see, the Roman empire’s uniqueness lies in the fact that it ultimately 
developed into a state with no master race nor domineering ethnic group. 
Fourthly and lastly, while he fully knows that Romanization, unlike 
Americanization, was a process in which different nations and ethnics 
                                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 150. 
17 Incidentally, it is to be noted in passing that not a few liberal and even socialist intellectuals 
in America reacted by swing to the right against the egalitarian movements since 1960’s and 
that the so-called neoconservatives among them, indeed, regarded the cause of equality as 
threatening to the American liberty and governmental authorities. cf. P. Steinfels, The 
Neoconservatives: the Men Who are Changing America’s Politics. New York, 1979, chs. 1 and 
9. 
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voluntarily participated, not one programmed and imposed from above and 
center,18 he seems to disregard the Roman precedent when he exhorts ethnic 
multiculturalists to conform to the principle of assimilation. Pace Galinksy, one 
may turn the tables and address his suggestion to the American majority so that 
they may learn from Romans that more openness could get along well with 
national integration. In the next chapter, I will show in this critical spirit two 
interconnected aspects of Roman empire: how much openness and 
multiculturalism was there in the Roman empire? What were its secrets of 
successful integration over the long duration? 
 
 
2 .  O p e n n e s s ,  M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ,  a n d  t h e  S e c r e t s  o f  e n d u r i n g   
Integration of the Roman Empire 
     Let’s start with the first question. Yet the concept of openness calls for 
clarification of the identity of its agent:  who were they that were open? I would 
answer the Italian Romans, until they lost gradually their privileges during the 
Principate through a series of important curtailing factors: the flood tide of 
municipalization in provinces in the 1st century C.E., the Consitutio Antoniana, 
and further Diocletian’s provincialization of Italy in the 3rd century C.E.19  Till 
then, Italy had been a sort of master nation reigning over the provinces of 
Roman empire. In the meantime, openness here signifies the attitudes, both 
mental and institutional, with which Romans treated or confronted the ‘others’, 
who could be provincials or barbarians beyond the frontiers. Let us address the 
mental aspect first.  
    It certainly would be idle to emphasize anew with Galinksy that there 
existed no such a thing as ‘racism’ among Romans. For racism as a 
discriminating attitude towards other races based on their biological or physical 
traits of inferiority, is, by definition, a modern invention.20  Thus, absence of 
                                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 149. 
19 Cf. A.N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship. Oxford, 1973 (2nd ed.), part. II; W. 
Simhäuser, “Untersuchungen zur Entstehung der Provizialverfassung Italiens,” Aufstieg 
und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II. 13, pp.401-452. I presume that J.P.V.D. Balsdon 
thinks similarly, though without elucidation, in his Romans and Aliens. Duckworth, 1979. 
see especially chs. 1 and 5. 
20 Cf. G.M. Frederikson, Racism: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2002, ch. 2. 
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color prejudice was not peculiar to Romans. 21   Likewise no vicious racial 
prejudice against Jews had been there comparable to anti- Semitism that began 
to emerge in the late Medieval Ages on religious pretext.22  True, some literate 
Romans like Tacitus and Juvenal expressed aversive emotion towards Jews on 
account of their exclusive and separatist way of life, but overall that attitude did 
not lead to religious persecution. On the contrary, the Roman authorities were 
tolerant of their religion and even tended to patronize them on the occasions of 
dire feud between them and Greeks.23  And indeed, one cannot be sure that 
Romans’ negative regard for Jews was necessarily severer than that they had for 
Greeks, which will be discussed below. 
     Now, the subject of Romans’ attitudes towards various categories of ethne 
confronted within and beyond the limes of empire. On this I need to simplify 
things for brevity’s sake: the attitudes could be explained by a certain analogy of 
ambivalent psychology operating generally whenever one confronts strange 
‘others’. Difference would stimulate mixed feelings like fear, inferiority, contempt 
and dislike as well as indifference, curiosity, admiration, and superiority. 24 And 
nuance in each and every case is to be determined according to who are ‘the    
others’ and what is the nature of the relation with them. For example, in facing 
Northern barbarians like Gauls and Germans, Romans had fears of their feritas, 
crudelitas etc., side by side with the sense of superiority based on techniques of 
civilization and warfare.  Yet, the old fears for the Gauls soon died off as soon as 
the barbarians were securely incorporated in the empire.25 Afterwards, Romans’ 
fear of the Northern barbarians was gradually transferred to Germans:  the 
remoter their abodes were from the Rhine the stronger the fear. Nuances 
                                                                 
21 Cf. F.M. Snowden, Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks. Harvard University 
Press, 1983, ch. 3. The author, himself black, having surveyed the Egyptian, Hebraic, and 
Greco-Roman views of blacks, concludes the 3rd chapter like this: “…the overall…view 
highly positive…And above all, the ancients did not stereotype all blacks as primitives 
defective religion and culture.” 
22 Cf. Frederikson, op. cit., ch. 1. 
23 A.N.Sherwin-White, Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome. Cambridge University Press, 1970, 
pp.86-101. 
24 I think that this ambivalent psychology of otherness is generally approximate to what Fr. 
Hartog wants to convey by ‘rhetoric of otherness’ in his The Mirror of Herodotus: The 
Representation of the Other in the Writing of History.  (English trans.) University of 
California Press, 1988, ch. 6. 
25 Cf. L.C. Ruggini, “Intolerance: Equal and Less Equal in the Roman World”, Classical 
Philology 82, 1987, pp.191-194; D.B. Saddington, “Race Relations in the Early Roman 
Empire”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 1975, pp.120-122. 
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between the first and second parts of the Germania well illustrate this. The 
author Tacitus, who certainly had not personally experienced the barbarians, 
seems to follow the then conventional attitudes: while he gave most 
commendation to the nearest and best known tribes in the first part, the 
description of the remoter tribes in the second part was filled with horror. After 
all, however, superiority rather than fear prevailed, and lead frequently to 
waging wars.  Again Tacitus testifies to the pretext or propaganda Romans used 
when justifying belligerence: they would provide barbarians the benefits of pax 
and humanitas (civilized life). 26 Though it seems certain that Tacitus here 
extrapolates from the current imperial ideology, that does not necessarily mean 
that Romans just like Greeks had inveterate prejudice against barbarians based 
upon the dichotomy of civilization versus barbarism.  27 For Romans knew well 
that they themselves once had not been credited with humanitas (paideia or 
philanthropia in Greek). 
     This brings us to the subject of Romans’ attitudes to their cultural 
superiors, the Greeks.  Greeks used to assume cultural superiority over the 
Romans, regarding them as barbaroi, and Romans were well aware of it.28 The 
making of the Roman legend of Trojan origin itself bespeaks the Roman wish to 
belong to the Greek world of civilization, and philhellenism was an irreversible 
cultural trend among the Roman upper classes during the last two centuries 
B.C.E.29  The Augustan laureate Horace superbly epitomizes the paradox that 
Greeks who had succumbed to Romans’ swords took their captor captive in turn 
on the strength of culture.30  Thus, some Greek intellectuals like Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, in the belief that Romans were indeed of Greek descent, even 
expressed the wishful thinking that Romans should take over upon themselves 
                                                                 
26  Tacitus, Agricola 30-32; Historiae IV. 73-74. cf. P. Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and 
non-Romans”, in A. Giardina (ed.), The Romans. The University of Chicago Press, 1993, ch. 
12; G. Woolf, Becoming Roman: the Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul. Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp.54-67. 
27 A. de Vivo,“L’idea di Roma e L’ideologia dell’Imperialismo in Tacito”, F. Giordano, L’idea di 
Roma nella Cultura Antica. Edizioni Scientifiche Italiene, 2001, pp.183-214. 
28 Cf. C. Champion, “Romans as Barbaroi”, Classical Philology 95, 2000, pp.425-444. For the 
evidence that the Romans knew the Greek attitude, see Cicero, De Re Publica I. 58. 
29 Cf. E.S. Gruen, Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome. Cornell University 
Press, 1992, chs. 1 and 6.; P. Veyne, “The Hellenization of Rome”, Diogenes 106, 1979, 
pp.1-27. 
30 Horatius, Epistulae 2.1.156: Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis intulit agresti Latio. 
cf. S.E. Alcock, Graecia Capta. Cambridge University Press, 1993, ch. 1. 
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the Greek mission of civilizing barbaroi.”31  Yet in spite of Romans’ zeal for 
Hellenism, Romans valued the assumption of common descent hardly at all, and 
further had a certain ethnic prejudice against Greeks. Ironically, Roman 
intellectuals tended to attribute to excessive urbanitas everything they found 
negative about Graeculus (a pejorative appellation for Greeks), while associating 
Romans’ generic traits with rusticitas. 32 As far as I am concerned, this means 
that Romans, inadvertently or deliberately, placed their self-identity halfway 
between civilization and barbarism. Hence it would not be far-fetched to infer 
that Romans were destined to be culturally open. For culturally Romans were 
not in the position to be arrogant or exclusive.  
    The institutional aspect of Romans’ openness also contributed a great deal 
to cultural diversity of Roman empire. Here, the openness of Roman citizenship,  
which was in striking contrast with the exclusiveness of Greek poleis, needs to 
be emphasized. Why Romans were far more generously admitting aliens is 
difficult to answer, but one thing is clear: otherwise they might not have 
survived the earlier wars in Italy, let alone the unification of Italy under their 
feet. The multi-layered structure of Roman citizenship was designed as an 
effective device to absorb the shock from the increasing admission of peregrines, 
but at the same time it worked to facilitate and accelerate the admission. Thus it 
happened that even slaves were manumitted, and ultimately franchised: so 
rampantly during the late Republic that Augustus had to contrive some 
inhibiting legislations. Meanwhile, the republican practices of individual grant 
to the magistrates of the coloniae, municipia, and allied communities persisted 
in imperial period. In addition, with the professionalization of Roman army 
underway in the early Principate, the soldiers of the auxiliary regiments and 
other non-citizen branches were rewarded with Roman citizenship on completion 
of 25 years of service.33  These newly franchised veterans on the whole chose to 
settle in the neighborhood of the camps where they had served, that is in the 
coloniae and municipia scattered like islands across the sea of provincials. As 
mentioned above, the increasing rate of those settlements hit the ceiling during 
the Flavian period ( late 1st century C.E.). Considering that slaves and free 
                                                                 
31 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates Romanae I. cf. J. Palm, Rom, Römertum, und 
Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit. Lund, 1959, pp.14-15; M. Fox, 
Roman Historical Myths: the Regal Period in Augustan Literature. Oxford, 1996, ch. 3. 
32 Cf. N.K. Petrochilos, Roman Attitudes to the Greeks. Athens, 1974, pp.35-53. 
33 Roughly 5,000 soldiers per year. 
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provincials of various locality and ethnicity were thus increasingly admitted into 
Roman citizenship, one should regard the edict of Caracalla in 212 C.E. with no 
surprise at all: it extended citizenship to all free provincials with minimal 
exceptions.34 
     Needless to say, the gradual absorption of peregrines into Roman 
citizenship contributed to extensive acculturation (or cultural fusion) among 
multifarious ethnics, as well as to promoting Romanization. But before moving 
onto that subject, another significant consequence ought to be pointed out: the 
dethronement of the master nation mentioned at the end of the first chapter.  
Acquisition of Roman citizenship played a role as springboard on which 
provincial elites could jump to the imperial central government by getting 
appointed in equestrian or senatorial offices. The statistics shows that since the 
early 2nd century C.E. the senators of provincial origin began to surpass in 
number those of Italian origin. Numbers ranged from 50% to 60% between the 
early 2nd century C.E. and the early 3rd century C.E.35 No surprise is equally the 
change in native place of emperors:  it moved out of Italy to western provinces 
in the 2nd century C.E. and then to eastern provinces in the next century   C.E. 
There will be no better evidence than this to show that the Roman empire was, 
at least in outlook, an open and diverse, but unified, civilization. Openness of 
this nature seems hardly likely to happen in multiethnic America. 
    Now, let me turn to the question of multiculturalism of Roman world. Again, 
a simplification seems inevitable here, for a detailed study would take an entire 
book. There were two main undercurrents flowing beneath the multifarious 
surface of cultural sea of Roman empire: Hellenization and Romanization. 
Hellenism had already attained full maturity in the Greek east when Romans 
arrived, yet the coming of Romans provided it new momentum to expand further 
into the western Mediterranean and into northern Europe. Nevertheless, in the 
west, its principal customers were limited to Romans of Italy, Sicily and 
Southern Gaul, while barbarian natives elsewhere were not likely to appreciate 
and be attracted to it. Especially, Hellenistic high culture, including philosophy, 
literature, and arts, were received and consumed mainly by Roman upper 
                                                                 
34 Sherwin-White, “Roman Citizenship: A Survey of its Development into a World Franchise”, 
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt I. 2, pp.55-58. 
35 Cf. M. Hammond, “Composition of the Senate, A.D. 68-235”, Journal of Roman Stuides  47, 
1957, pp.74-81; G. Salmeri, “Dalle Provinze a Roma”, in Storia di Roma. II. 1: I Principi e il 
Mondo. Torino, 1991, pp.561-562. 
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classes. On  the other hand, Roman legions and the settlements nearby in 
western and northern provinces could also attract the carriers of Hellenism from 
the east (slaves, merchants, and priests),  for they were relatively big spenders 
by the then standard. Hellenistic religions as the offshoots of syncretism 
between oriental and Greek cults did pervade there as well as among the masses 
of Italian cities and towns. Of course, these religions also had to undergo some 
acculturation in order to adjust themselves to the expectations of Roman or 
Romanized populations. The cult of Isis and Sarapis, for example, was often 
linked to the imperial household (domus Augusta) from the Flavian dynasty on.36 
     Thus, Hellenization under the Roman empire was, we may say, a process of 
acculturation underway more briskly in the west and to the north of the 
Mediterranean. Romanization was also a phenomenon whose success was 
brilliant in the West, for the Greek East, home of Hellenism, had no reason and 
intention to be Romanized. They were very proud of their language, physical and 
mental modus vivendi, and above all, their traditional way of constructing life 
space, both private and public.  Of course, exception always exists to prove the 
rule.  Gladiatorial combats and Roman style of bathing, the most characteristic 
elements of Roman culture, were sparsely introduced in the east, mostly as a 
part of evergetism of Roman big-shots or the richest and most prominent   
citizens of provincial towns. 37  Very rarely, a tiny segment of the native elites 
even learned Latin, chose Latin nomenclature, and put on toga etc. Yet the 
imperial government itself did not seek to Romanize: official settlement and 
colonization of Roman citizens, which could have played a role as nuclei of 
Romanization, were very few; Roman law was applied only in certain aspects of 
family law.38 
     Tacitus happens to provide an excellent description of what Romanization 
was like in the barbarian west: public buildings such as temples, courts of justice, 
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dwelling-houses, a liberal education for the sons of the chiefs, speaking Latin 
language, the toga, the bath, the elegant banquet etc. (Agricola 21). Coloniae and 
municipia, isolated spaces of civilization in a sea of barbarism, worked as models 
of Romanization. Again, when emulation by natives occurred, it was basically of 
voluntary nature: Rome was not committed to imposing her culture on the 
provincials in the west either.39  If there were anything like official policy, it 
aimed chiefly at pacification and tax collection.  
     One intriguing question arises at once: how was it possible that both 
Hellenization and Romanization made huge strides largely on a voluntary basis? 
One may get some insight into the answer from a theorem that sprang to A. 
Tocqueville’s mind in his first encounter with American Indians. It runs: a 
human group adopts the values of a foreign civilization only on condition that, 
after its conversion, it should not find itself on the very bottom level of that 
civilization. 40  In its light may be illuminated also why in America ethnic 
multiculturalism chose to resist Americanization, which has been guided by 
assimilation policy.  
     Let me recapitulate the discussion so far before moving to the last question: 
first, Romans had neither racial bigotry nor cultural arrogance; second, Rome’s 
citizenship policy was so open that the master nation who had built the empire 
was ultimately dethroned; lastly, multiculturalism was characterized by the two 
different, but interconnected processes of acculturation, namely Hellenization 
and Romanization, and in the process Roman government did not intervene 
programmatically. These major points obligate me to pose my last question: what 
were the secrets of the Roman empire in managing successful and prolonged 
integration with so much openness and multiculturalism ? 
     Again, the absence of another modern invention, nationalism, ought to be 
pointed out first. Given nationalism, let alone the modern resources of mass 
transportation and communication, it could have been far more effective for the 
leadership of native revolts to mobilize compatriots massively in deep-rooted and 
lasting opposition to Roman rule.41 However, the reported causes of the revolts 
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were not at all of the nature that could be sufficiently threatening to Roman 
authorities: private grudges against individual leaders; occasional complaints 
against the imposition or extortion of taxes; and in the case of the Jews only, 
religious beliefs. 42  
     That native revolts were not widespread and chronic seems to point to the 
other side of the coin: native residents lived always in fearful consciousness of 
the overpowering might of the Roman army. The Jewish historian Josephus in 
the 1st century C.E. testifies to this grim reality of Roman dominion through the 
mouth of Herod Agrippa II, when he desperately tried to dissuade his Jewish 
subjects from revolting against Rome. “Will you shut your eyes to the might of 
the Roman empire…? Have not our forces been constantly defeated even by the 
neighboring nations, while theirs have never met with a reverse throughout the 
whole known world?”43  
     The Jewish king could have appealed to the brighter side of Roman 
military power, that is, the benefit of pax Romana. In fact, that was the most 
favorite topos in the current beneficial ideology, and its examples abound in the 
extant Greek and Latin literature of 1st and 2nd centuries C.E. Yet, citation of a 
provincial view must be in order, and my choice here is a snippet from Plutarch’s 
moral essay: “For observe that of the greatest blessings which States can 
enjoy,--peace, liberty, plenty, abundance of men, and concord,--so far as peace is 
concerned the peoples have no need of statesmanship at present; for all war, both 
Greek and foreign, has been banished from among us.”44 The Greek moralist 
continues to elaborate on other blessings Roman peace entailed: material and 
cultural opportunities and achievements.45 Certainly, ideology could be always 
deceiving, but the prevalence of the beneficial ideology here ought to be 
interpreted as reflecting realities more or less. 
     Finally, the solidarity of the Roman empire depended in large measure on a 
mutually advantageous exchange of power and prestige between imperial capital 
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and provincial urban nuclei. In other words, patronage-clientele between 
emperors and local elites (or aristocracies, if you will) was not only an effective 
mechanism binding the periphery (provinces) with the center (emperor), but also 
functioned as a complement for the lack of bureaucracy. According to K. Hopkins, 
the Roman Empire with a population estimated at 50-60 million people was 
managed with only about 150 administrators in the 2nd century C.E., while the 
southern China of 12th century C.E. with a population of a similar size needed 
4,000 officials working in the provinces. 46  What did make up for this 
under-developed bureaucracy was the centripetal tendency of local elites and 
their loyalty to the emperor. They competed fiercely among themselves for 
securing amicitia  (et beneficia) Caesaris:  it was invaluable for maintaining 
their local prestige and influence, and further in advancing upward to the 
imperial aristocracy. As F. Millar has brilliantly shown, this patronage and 
promotion system had worked well enough to integrate the vast empire until 
far-reaching changes in the 3rd to 4th centuries C.E. began to undermine it. 47 
 
                                                                 
46 Cf. K. Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire”, Journal of Roman Studies 70, 
1980, p. 121. 
47 F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC-AD 337). Cornell University Press. 
1977. 
 
